Chebyshev polynomials have been recently proposed for designing public-key systems. Indeed, they enjoy some nice chaotic properties, which seem to be suitable for use in Cryptography. Moreover, they satisfy a semi-group property, which makes possible implementing a trapdoor mechanism. In this paper, we study a public-key cryptosystem based on such polynomials, which provides both encryption and digital signature. The cryptosystem works on real numbers and is quite efficient. Unfortunately, from our analysis, it comes up that it is not secure. We describe an attack which permits to recover the corresponding plaintext from a given ciphertext. The same attack can be applied to produce forgeries if the cryptosystem is used for signing messages. Then, we point out that also other primitives, a Diffie-Hellman like key agreement scheme and an authentication scheme, designed along the same lines of the cryptosystem, are not secure due to the aforementioned attack. We close the paper by discussing the issues and the possibilities of constructing public-key cryptosystems on real numbers.
I. INTRODUCTION
C HAOS AND CRYPTOGRAPHY. The study of chaotic systems and their possible applications to Cryptography has received considerable attention during the last years in a part of the scientific community. Chaotic systems are indeed characterized by sensitive dependence on initial conditions and similarity to random behavior, properties which seem pretty much the same required by several cryptographic primitives (see [20] for a brief overview).
In [17] , for the first time a symmetric key cryptosystem based on chaos theory was presented in a well-established cryptographic conference, but it was cryptoanalyzed in the same conference [5] . Another scheme based on chaotic systems was broken in [3] .
Since then, chaos theory has not received much attention inside the cryptographic community. However, it has had several applications in other communication areas and people involved in chaos theory have been keeping working on the idea of using Manuscript received April 21, 2004 the properties of chaotic systems in designing efficient cryptographic primitives.
Two main approaches to the use of chaotic systems in designing cryptographic systems can be found in the literature. One of these approaches uses hardware-based synchronized chaotic circuits [25] where, in order to encrypt messages, the cleartext is hidden in the spectral domain of the chaotic signal. This method is strongly related to the concept of synchronization of two chaotic systems and the interested reader can find a survey on the state of art in this field in [19] .
The other, still for encryption purposes, has investigated the simulation of chaotic discrete dynamical systems on a computer (see [12] , [23] , [34] to name few).
Many chaotic systems are defined over real numbers. On the other hand, Cryptography deals with systems defined mostly on finite fields. This yields some immediate consequences. Some ordinary design strategies and standard cryptanalytic methods cannot be applied to cryptosystems based on chaotic systems working over real numbers. Just to exemplify, cryptographic systems have secret parameters taking values over a large but finite field. Hence, a brute force attack, which simply tries all elements of the field in searching the secret values might be infeasible but possible. If the range of the parameters of a cryptosystem based on real numbers is a continous infinite interval, an exhaustive search is just impossible.
However, at the state of current knowledge, the security of chaos-based cryptosystems defined over real numbers is not well understood.
PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY. Public Key Cryptography enables users who do not share any secret key to securely communicate over a public channel. More precisely, in a public-key cryptosystem every user has a pair of keys . The key of user is public and can be used by everybody else to send an encrypted message to . The key enables to decrypt messages encrypted with key , and is kept secret by . Hence, is the only user able to decrypt encrypted messages. Roughly speaking, the security of a public-key cryptosystem, is based on the assumption that computing the secret key given the public key one (even if theoretically possible) is computationally infeasible.
From an historical point of view, Diffie and Hellman, with the publication in 1976 of their paper, New Directions in Cryptography [13] , introduced the idea 1 of public-key cryptography. Later on, Rivest, Shamir and Adlemann (RSA), proposed the well-known RSA cryptosystem [29] , which realized such an idea. Since then many new cryptosystems have been proposed (see [27] , [24] for some relevant examples) and, in general, public-key cryptography is a well-established and sound field of knowledge.
THE ISSUE OF SECURITY. Two of the top concerns cryptographers have been dealing with since the idea of public-key cryptography was introduced are what a secure public-key cryptosystem is and how an efficient one can be constructed. The first received an answer by Goldwasser and Micali in [16] , where the notion of semantic security (w.r.t. passive attacks) was established, and by Rackoff and Simon [28] , where adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks were considered. The adversary in the latter powerful setting has access to the decryption algorithm and can obtain the plaintexts corresponding to ciphertext messages of his own choosing (apart the challenge ciphertext he has to attack).
However, it turned out to be a difficult task to get an efficient cryptosystem, secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. Several proposals were given over the years. In 1998, Cramer and Shoup [10] gave the first practical and provablysecure public-key encryption scheme. We refer the interested reader to the journal version [11] of such a paper [10] for details about the cryptosystem and for a brief hystorical excursus.
STANDARD MODEL AND RANDOM ORACLE MODEL. The methodology usually applied in Cryptography in order to show that a given protocol meets certain security requirements is reductionist: assuming that for a well-known computational problem there are no efficient (i.e., probabilistic polynomial time) algorithms, it is shown that an efficient algorithm breaking the security requirements of the protocol can be used as a building block for constructing an efficient algorithm for solving the supposed to be hard computational problem. In other words, the security of the protocol is reduced to the presumed difficulty of a certain computational problem.
Several currently available public-key cryptosystems are defined over finite fields and use modular arithmetics. Their security is often based on the presumed difficulty of solving certain number theoretic problems, like factoring large composite integers, computing the discrete logarithm in finite multiplicative groups, deciding quadratic residuosity of an element, computing square roots and so on. More precisely, two kinds of proofs of security have been given. The first ones are proofs in the so-called standard model, where the security of the scheme is based on standard assumptions, like the aforementioned ones.
The second deal with the so-called random oracle model [2] , where a sort of idealized model is considered, and the scheme is proved secure in such a model. Then, it is argued that if in the real world the idealized component (i.e., a random function) is opportunely instanciated (e.g., by means of a concrete hash function) the scheme is secure. However, it has been shown that there are schemes secure in the random oracle model but insecure in any implementation in the real world [6] . Hence, the latter are also considered as "heuristic proofs" of security.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS. Several well-known and widely used cryptosystems have not been proven secure according to the reductionistic methodology. Formal proofs in the standard model or in the random oracle model have not always been found.
Such cryptosystems have been considered secure when they have been used for a long time and no easy method for breaking them has been discovered.
PUBLIC-KEY SCHEMES AS DYNAMICAL SYSTEM. Since 1976, numerous public-key algorithms have been proposed; three most widely used public-key crypto-systems are: RSA, Rabin and ElGamal. From a dynamical point of view, all three encryption algorithms, RSA, ElGamal, and Rabin, employ one single system (1) where is an integer, , and , and are properly chosen integers. For example, in the ElGamal public-key scheme, one uses (1), where is a prime, is a generator of the multiplicative group of integers modulo , and . In the RSA algorithm, , where and are two random distinct primes, is an integer , where , such that , and is the message to be encrypted. Rabin public-key encryption scheme uses (1) with , , where and primes both congruent to , and is the message to be encrypted. All three schemes use the following property of (1): (2) In this paper, we only consider dynamical systems defined over real numbers and enjoying property (2) . Recently, several authors have suggested public-key encryption algorithms based on chaotic dynamical systems, defined on real numbers, for which the property (2) is satisfied.
K. Umeno was probably the first author who suggested that a rational map defined by the elliptic function, which can be expressed directly by a rational polynomial [30] , can be used in the public-key scenario [31] . In [21] the authors proposed a public-key encryption algorithm and a signature algorithm, using chaotic Chebyshev polynomials, and suggested an alternative implementation by means of some generalized Chebyshev maps (see [22] and [30] ), termed Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps in [22] .
OUR CONTRIBUTION. We start by analyzing the public-key cryptosystem based on chaos theory, described in [21] , which uses Chebyshev polynomials. We show that such a cryptosystem, even if efficient and practical, unfortunately, is not secure. Indeed, we describe an attack that permits to recover the corresponding plaintext from a given ciphertext. The same attack can be applied to produce forgeries if the cryptosystem is used for signing messages. We also consider a realization of the cryptosystem on the Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps. We show that the attack works against this cryptosystem as well. Then, we point out that also other primitives, a Diffie-Hellman like key agreement scheme [31] and an authentication scheme [36] , designed along the same lines of the cryptosystem, are not secure due to the aforementioned attack. We close the paper by discussing the main issues concerning with the design and the implementation of public-key systems that work on real numbers, summarizing our results, and outlining some possible research directions. 
II. CHEBYSHEV POLYNOMIALS
In this section, we briefly describe Chebyshev polynomials, since they represent the cornerstone on which the public-key cryptosystem, described in [21] , and the authentication scheme, described in [36] , are built.
Definition II.1: Let be an integer, and let be a variable taking value over the interval . The polynomial is recursively defined as for any where and . Some examples of Chebyshev polynomials are (see Fig. 1 )
One of the most important properties of Chebyshev polynomials is the so-called semi-group property which establishes that
An immediate consequence of this property is that Chebyshev polynomials commute under composition
III. CRYPTOSYSTEM BASED ON CHEBYSHEV POLYNOMIALS
A public-key cryptosystem based on Chebyshev polynomials was proposed in [21] . It can be viewed as a generalization of the ElGamal public-key cryptosystem [14] .
A. Cryptosystem
The cryptosystem is composed of three algorithms: a Key Generation algorithm, an Encryption algorithm, and a Decryption algorithm.
Key Generation Algorithm: Key Generation takes place in three steps:
Alice, in order to generate the keys, does the following: 1. Generates a large integer . 2. Selects a random number and computes . 3. Alice sets her public key to and her private key to .
Encryption Algorithm: Encryption requires five steps:
Bob, in order to encrypt a message, does the following: 
B. Correctness of the Cryptosystem
The algorithm is correct due to the semi-group property of the Chebyshev polynomials. Indeed, encryption provides Since Chebyshev polynomials commute under composition, it follows that Therefore
C. Implementation
Both encryption and decryption involve the evaluation of Chebyshev polynomials. If we evaluate Chebyshev polynomials directly, applying the recursive definition, then the computation of takes linear time in . However, it is possible to further reduce the computation to a logarithmic number of steps [15] , by noticing that and re-organizing the computation. More precisely, we can use the recursive relation for evaluating Chebyshev polynomials if is even odd
Another important issue that must be considered when implementing the above cryptosystem is the finite precision of the arithmetics. In [21] the authors pointed out that the semi-group property of Chebyshev polynomials, stated by (3), holds only if the values and , chosen by Alice and Bob, are such that and , where and are constant values depending on the arithmetics precision used in implementing the encryption and decryption algorithms. They gave a table where, for certain precisions, expressed in terms of bits, some possible upperbound for and hold. For example, a 2048-bit precision implies constants and smaller than . Such upperbounds where empirical determined. No general relation linking the arithmetic precision of the operations to the values of and is currently known.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF CRYPTOSYSTEM
In this section, we show that the above cryptosystem is not secure. Given a ciphertext an adversary, by exploiting the same definition of Chebyshev polynomials and after some algebra, can recover the cleartext. In [21] , it was presumed to be secure based on the following observation: as pointed out the scheme resembles ElGamal encryption scheme. The security of ElGamal encryption scheme is based on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem in , i.e., given , and , find . In the above scheme, given and , the value is the value of a polynomial of order , not just a power . Hence, computing the order of the polynomial , given only one pair seems to be much harder than computing from a power. Thus, recovering given and seems only possible by computing for all and, then, comparing for which the equality holds. Unfortunately, there are some fundamental differences between the two schemes: the ElGamal scheme is implemented over and uses modular arithmetic. Then, given and the discrete logarithm is uniquely determined while, as we will show later, there are several Chebyshev polynomials passing through the same point.
A. How to Recover the Plaintext
In this section, we present an attack which enables an adversary to recover from a given ciphertext the corresponding cleartext.
First of all, we will use the trigonometric functions and defined as and The function has period . Notice that Chebyshev polynomials can be alternatively defined as follows. (5) the adversary has to find an integer and a positive integer solutions to one of the two equations or (6) given and . Let and be the fractional parts of and . The actual problem becomes solving or How to find k in a real implementation. Assume that we use a finite precision implementation in base , and that is the maximum number of digits of and . Then, multiplying all terms by , we can rewrite the above equations in equivalent form as and Denoting by the integer and by the integer , the solutions to the above equations are exactly the solutions to the linear modular equations and (7) However, notice that we can restrict our attention to just one of the above modular equations. Indeed, since is equivalent to , once we have solved , we easily derive the solutions to the second one. More precisely, if is solution to then is solution to . We can get efficiently the set of solutions to linear modular equations of the form (see, for example, [9, ch. 33]). Denoting by the subgroup of elements of generated by , it is easy to see that the modular equation has solutions if and only if . Moreover, denoting by the , the above membership condition is equivalent to . The set of distinct solutions to (if there exist) has cardinality and is given by for where the first solution can be obtained directly by applying the extended Euclidean algorithm. Indeed, such an algorithm, on input , outputs a triple of integers where , and it is easy to check that is solution to
. From a computational point of view, the above procedure is efficient since the running time of the extended Euclidean algorithm requires steps in the worst case.
Coming back to our setting, notice that the equations given in (7) have solutions by construction. More precisely, there are exactly distint solutions for each of them, which can be easily found applying the above method. Clearly, just one solution suffices to the adversary's goal.
B. An Example
We show how an adversary, given Alice's public key and the ciphertext , where , constructed by Bob in order to send to Alice, computes the value . Then, dividing by , he recovers . Let us start by generating Alice's public-key parameters. Let and . Then, , and . Hence, Alice's public key is given by the pair Assume that Bob, in order to encrypt a message M, chooses . Then and By applying the strategy described before, an adversary computes an such that . Since it holds that and the set of possible integer indexes is given by Hence, the adversary has to find a solution to one of the following two equations:
and (8) where . By considering only the fractional parts, the problem becomes solving one of or where . Since , then , and the above equations are equivalent to and whose solutions are exactly the solutions to the modular equations and (9) Let us consider the first one. This equation has solutions since and . Precisely, there are 2 solutions, given by , for , where 4 is the solution obtained directly by means of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm. By choosing one of them, for example 4, the corresponding index , computed evaluating the first one of (8) is 32. Then, it holds that Hence, the adversary has computed . The cleartext sent by Bob is computed by the adversary as . For completeness, notice the two solutions to the second equation are and are obtained by computing and . By choosing one of them, for example 1, the corresponding index , computed evaluating the second of (8) is 4. Then, it holds that Hence, the adversary has computed . The cleartext sent by Bob is computed by the adversary as .
V. CRYPTOSYSTEM BASED ON JACOBIAN ELLIPTIC CHEBYSHEV RATIONAL MAPS
As suggested in [21] , instead of using Chebyshev polynomials, the cryptosystem we have previously analised can be also realized by using the Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps, studied in [30] and [22] . In the following subsections we show how to implement such a cryptosystem. Then, we show that the attack we have identified for the cryptosystem based on Chebyshev polynomials applies to this cryptosystem as well.
A. Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps
The Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps are rational functions defined as follows [22] . Hence, these maps commute under composition, i.e.,
B. Cryptosystem
Alice, in order to generate the keys, does the following: 1. Generates a large integer . 2. Selects two random numbers and , and computes . 3. Alice sets her public key to and her private key to .
Encryption Algorithm: Encryption requires five steps:
Bob, in order to encrypt a message, does the following: Notice that, the value of , which defines the form of the map, could be the same for all users of the system.
C. Correctness of the Cryptosystem
The cryptosystem is correct due to the semi-group property of the Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps. Indeed, encryption provides
Since the maps commute under composition, it follows that Therefore
D. Jacobian Elliptic Functions and Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps
Jacobian elliptic Chebyshev rational maps can be equivalently defined by means of the Jacobian elliptic functions [22] . Let , let , and let be the angle, referred to as the amplitude of , defined by Then, the Jacobian elliptic functions and are defined as follows:
and Let
. The above functions are doubly-periodic, having a real period and an imaginary one. More precisely, denoting by and where is the imaginary unit, we get that has periods and ; while has periods and . We restrict our attention to the real periodicity.
For any fixed , the function , inverse of the Jacobian elliptic function , relatively to the interval , is given by where . Then, we can state the following alternative definition for the Jacobian elliptic Chebyshev rational maps.
Definition V.2: Let be an integer, let be a real number, and let . The Jacobian elliptic Chebyshev rational maps with modulus are defined by
E. Efficient Computation of , and
The functions , and , all defined in terms of elliptic integrals, can be efficiently computed by means of the Arithmetic-Geometric Method, (A.G.M. method, for short). Roughly speaking, such a method works as follows: starting with , it proceeds to determine number triples according to the following scheme of arithmetic and geometric mean:
Assume that we use an arithmetic in base with -digit precision of the operations. The procedure stops at the th step when , i.e., when . Notice that such an equality is achieved when the relative error is less than the degree of accurancy fixed by the implementation i.e., . It has been estimated (see, for example [32] ) that the relative error decays approximatively as , from which it easily follows that the method converges after roughly steps. To compute the functions and , we apply the A.G.M method starting with , and . Once the A.G.M method stops, we compute the angle (in degrees) . Then, applying, for , the recurrence relation , we compute the angles . Finally, and On the other hand, to evaluate , for , by applying the recurrence relation , where , we compute the angles , and then Notice that the quarter-period can be easily computed as well, since it is a special case of the computation of (just set the angle . The reader is referred to [1] for further details on the A.G.M method, and on the computation of , and . Moreover, an efficient implementation of the above functions can be found in [33] .
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF CRYPTOSYSTEM
Apart the complexity of the mathematical objects we are dealing with, the attack we have applied against the public-key scheme based on Chebyshev polynomials still works against the cryptosystem based on Jacobian elliptic Chebyshev rational maps.
A. How to Recover the Plaintext
Let be Alice's public key. In order to encrypt a message , Bob chooses a large integer and computes and Then, he sends the ciphertext to Alice. Unfortunately an adversary, given Alice's public key and the ciphertext , can recover as follows:
The adversary, to get the message, does the following: Hence, applying the function to both members of the equality, and using the periodicity of and the property , we get that for
. Notice that we are only considering the real periodicity, since we are not interested in imaginary solutions. Let
We can show that contains all possible integers defining maps passing through , for certain , and . The proof proceeds along the same lines of the proof provided for Lemma IV.2. We omit it since it is essentially the same.
Lemma VI.1: For each triple , the integer satisfies if and only if . Setting and as in (5), we apply exactly the same steps we have done in Subsection IV-I describing the attack against the cryptosystem based on Chebyshev polynomials. Hence, an adversary can recover the plaintext from the ciphertext.
B. Example
We show how an adversary, given Alice's public key and the ciphertext , where , constructed by Bob in order to send to Alice, computes the value . Then, dividing by , he recovers . Let us start by generating Alice's public-key parameters. Let , and . Then, . Hence, Alice's public key is given by the triple Assume that Bob, in order to encrypt a message , chooses . Then and By applying the strategy described in Section VI-A, an adversary computes an such that . The set of possible integer indexes is given by Hence, the adversary has to find a solution to one of the following two equations:
and (11) where . By considering only the fractional parts, the problem becomes solving one of or where . Since , then , and the above equations are equivalent to and whose solutions are exactly the solutions to the modular equations and (12) Let us consider the first one. This equation has solutions since and . Precisely, there are 2 solutions, given by , for , where 3 is the solution obtained directly by means of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm. By choosing one of them, for example 3, the corresponding index , computed evaluating the first one of (11) is 20. Then, it holds that Hence, the adversary has computed . The cleartext sent by Bob is computed by the adversary as .
VII. KEY AGREEMENT BY USING RATIONAL MAPS
Rational maps enjoying the semi-group property can be also used to design a Diffie-Hellman like key agreement scheme. Umeno [31] was the first author who suggested such a method. Let us briefly recall the following definitions, given in [24] .
Definition VII.1: Key establishment is any process whereby a shared secret key becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent cryptographic use.
Definition VII.2: A key agreement protocol or mechanism is a key establishment technique in which a shared secret is derived by two or more parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these, ideally such that no party can predetermine the resulting value.
Let us look at the following key agreement protocol. Let be a public real value, and let be a rational map enjoying the semi-group property, i.e., .
Bob, in order to agree on a common key with Alice, does the following: It is easy to check that if the rational map used in the above scheme is a Chebyshev Polynomial or a Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational map then, since is public and and are sent in clear over the channel, an adversary who taps the channel, with no knowledge of the secret values and , can employ the same attack we have described before for the public-key cryptosystem, and compute the common key.
VIII. ENTITY AUTHENTICATION BASED ON CHEBYSHEV POLYNOMIALS
Chebyshev Polynomials have also been used to design an authentication scheme. Entity authentication is defined as follows [24] .
Definition VIII.1: Entity authentication is the process whereby one party is assured (through acquisition of corroborative evidence) of the identity of a second party involved in a protocol, and that the second has actually participated (i.e., is active at, or immediately prior to, the time evidence is acquired).
In [36] , a scheme based on Chebyshev Polynomials, by means of which a user can efficiently authenticate himself to a server in order to log in, was proposed. It strongly resembles the public-key cryptosystem described in [21] . Apart minor implementation details, the scheme works as follows.
Let be a real value, and denote by the map iterated times, i.e., . It is easy to see that, if and are public, an adversary who gets the messages associated with the first log in request, can apply the same attack we have described before in order to get an integer such that . Then, at the ith session, he can authenticate himself as the real user by computing , and . Indeed, it is easy to show, arguing by induction on , that . Therefore, it holds that Thus, the scheme is not secure. One way to avoid the above attack is to make and private to the user and the server. Unfortunately, the scheme is not secure even if and are private. Indeed, even in this scenario, an adversary with no knowledge of the private values and , who just listen to two consecutive authentication phases, can subsequently authenticate himself to the server as it were the real user. More precisely, assume that the adversary gets and . Then, the attack works as follows:
Setup Phase-Server
The adversary does the following: Notice that the adversary does not need to know the index of the session. He just needs two consecutive authentication messages.
In order to understand why the attack works, notice that an integer such that can be computed by applying the same attack we have described before against the cryptosystem. Then, we can proceed by induction on to show that and Let
. It is easy to see that Then, notice that Indeed Therefore Assume that and By applying the inductive hypothesis, it holds that and Thus, the attack works.
IX. PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS ON REAL NUMBERS
Currently used public-key cryptosystems are defined over finite fields and use modular arithmetics. Their security is often based on the difficulty of solving certain number theoretic problems, such as factoring large composite integers, computing the discrete logarithm in finite multiplicative groups, deciding quadratic residuosity, computing square roots, and so on. In other words, they are designed in such a way that the cryptosystem can be broken if the underlying problem, presumed to be difficult, becomes easy to solve. At the moment, this method cannot be applied to realize chaos-based cryptosystems, since they are defined over real numbers.
Certainly two important issues must be solved in order to design a secure public-key cryptosystem based on real numbers. In order to apply a reductionistic approach, some presumed difficult problem over the field of real numbers which permits implementing some one-way trapdoor function or permutation should be identified. Moreover, as the above attack in a certain way points out, the finite representation of real numbers in a computer with finite memory and the finite precision of the operations, performed by such a machine, deserve an in-depth study in order to well understand the implications in terms of security they give rise to. Paradoxically, it might also exist a good technique for implementing a secure cryptosystem over the infinite field of real numbers which turns out to be insecure for any finite implementation over a finite computer using a finite arithmetic precision.
Some studies dealing with the possibility of cryptographic primitives over nonclassical computational models have already been done. For example, in [7] , the possibility of secret sharing schemes [4] , [26] over infinite countable domains, like the set of all binary strings, was studied. It was shown that no such a scheme exist. Later on, in [8] , the case of private computations over the integers was studied, and it was shown that some lower bounds that hold in the finite case do not extend to infinite domains. Recently, in [35] , Cryptography over the infinite field of rational numbers, giving all parties unbounded computational power, has been considered. Under the assumption that users can sample random real numbers, and that standard field operations can be used, it turned out that secure signature and secure encryption do not exist. As well as, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, oblivious transfer, and interactive encryption.
X. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this paper, we have analyzed a public-key cryptosystem based on Chebyshev polynomials. Unfortunately, even if it is efficient and based on a fascinating and elegant idea, we have shown that it is not secure, since an adversary can efficiently recover the plaintext from a given ciphertext. The proposed cryptosystem can be implemented by using any chaotic map for which can be written as , and such that , i.e., it enjoys the semi-group property. Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps represent another class of maps enjoying such a property. We have shown that the attack described in Section 5 can still be applied if these maps are used. Moreover, we have analyzed a Diffie-Hellman like key agreement scheme based on rational maps and we have pointed out that if Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps are used, then the scheme is not secure, in the sense that a passive adversary can compute the common key. We stress here that for the class of rational mappings enjoying the semi-group property, which comes from multiplication formulas of periodic functions, Weierstrass's theorem [37] says that this class is limited to Jacobian elliptic functions and Chebyshev polynomials [38] . Therefore, the conclusion of this paper has a certain universality: rational maps enjoying the semi-group property, which comes from multiplication formulas of periodic functions, are not secure for public-key encryption. Finally, we have also shown that a recently proposed authentication scheme, designed along the same lines of the public-key cryptosystem, is still subject to our attack and, hence, it is not secure. The attack we have described works in every case in which the maps enjoy the semi-group property, and given and , it can be efficiently computed an integer solution to the equation . However, the design and investigation of other chaos-based public-key systems are interesting topics for future researches.
